Among the scenarios that have been seen as potentially workable is the “Finlandization” of Ukraine — something that France’s President Emmanuel Macron was said to have suggested as “one of the models on the table” (he denied it later) amid rising tensions in early February, and which had been floated earlier in 2014, the year Russia annexed Crimea and fighting broke out in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region.

The exercise of the “Finland” option at this stage is however complicated — with Russia having already reduced significant parts of Ukraine to rubble, and President Joe Biden having described President Vladimir Putin as “a murderous dictator, a pure thug who is waging an immoral war against the people of Ukraine”.

Meaning of the term

‘Finlandization’ refers to the policy of strict neutrality between Moscow and the West that Finland followed during the decades of the Cold War. The principle of neutrality was rooted in the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (or YYA Treaty, from the Finnish “Ystävyys-, yhteistyö- ja avunantosopimus”) that Finland signed with the USSR in April 1948.

Article 1 of the treaty (translated) reads: “In the eventuality of Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the object of an armed attack by Germany or any state allied with the latter (meaning, essentially, the United States), Finland will, true to its obligations as an independent state, fight to repel the attack.

“Finland will in such cases use all its available forces for defending its territorial integrity by land, sea, and air, and will do so within the frontiers of Finland in accordance with obligations defined in the present agreement and, if necessary, with the assistance of or jointly with, the Soviet Union.

“In (these) cases, the Soviet Union will give Finland the help that it requires, subject to mutual agreement between the contracting parties.”

Context and reasoning

The 1948 treaty formed the basis of Helsinki-Moscow relations until 1992, when Finland signed a new agreement with post-Soviet Russia. It lay at the heart of Finland’s foreign policy doctrine especially when Juho Kusti Paasikivi (1946-56) and Urho Kekkonen (1956-82) were President, and is known in international relations studies as the “Paasikivi-Kekkonen line”.

From the perspective of Finland — whose capital Helsinki is situated just across the Gulf of Finland from St Petersburg (Leningrad) — the treaty protected it from being attacked or incorporated into the USSR like the Baltic and eastern European states. It allowed the country to pursue the path of democracy and capitalism while staying out of the conflict between the great powers.

Finland did not participate in the Marshall Plan, the post-War European recovery programme named after President Harry S Truman’s Secretary of State George C Marshall, which promoted the idea of shared interests and cooperation between the US and Europe. It took neutral positions on matters on which the Soviet Union and the West disagreed. It stayed aloof from NATO and European military powers, and used this positioning to ward off pressure from Moscow to become part of the Soviet bloc or the Warsaw Pact.

Ukraine and Finlandization

In an op-ed article titled ‘To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end’ published in The Washington Post in March 2014, Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977, argued that “if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them”.

Kissinger put forward four points summarising his “notion of an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides”. The first three of them remain relevant to the current crisis in Ukraine as well, and the third explicitly advocates the option of Finlandization.

“1. Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe.

“2. Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.

“3. Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia.”

Also in 2014, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as the US National Security Advisor from 1977 to 1981 and is recognised as one of the most prominent voices that shaped Cold War American foreign policy, told DW in an interview: “If we want a solution that’s constructive it has to be based on compromise. And I can envisage Ukraine evolving in the context of a constructive compromise into a country whose domestic and foreign policies will be somewhat similar to that of Finland.”

In an Op-Ed written at the time in the Financial Times titled ‘Russia needs to be offered a ‘Finland option’ for Ukraine’, Brzezinski recommended: “The US could and should convey clearly to Mr Putin that it is prepared to use its influence to make certain that a truly independent and territorially undivided Ukraine pursues policies towards Russia similar to those so effectively practised by Finland: mutually respectful neighbours, wide-ranging economic relations both with Russia and the EU, but no participation in any military alliance viewed by Moscow as directed at itself – while also expanding its European connectivity. In brief, the Finnish model as the ideal example for Ukraine, and the EU, and Russia.”

Newsletter | Click to get the day’s best explainers in your inbox